In this paper, intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs) are employed to enhance the physical layer security in a challenging radio environment. In particular, a multi-antenna access point (AP) has to serve multiple single-antenna legitimate users, which do not have line-of-sight communication links, in the presence of multiple multi-antenna potential eavesdroppers whose channel state information (CSI) is not perfectly known. Artificial noise (AN) is transmitted from the AP to deliberately impair the eavesdropping channels for security provisioning. We investigate the joint design of the beamformers and AN covariance matrix at the AP and the phase shifters at the IRSs for maximization of the system sum-rate while limiting the maximum information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers. To this end, we formulate a robust nonconvex optimization problem taking into account the impact of the imperfect CSI of the eavesdropping channels. To address the non-convexity of the optimization problem, an efficient algorithm is developed by capitalizing on alternating optimization, a penalty-based approach, successive convex approximation, and semidefinite relaxation. Simulation results show that IRSs can significantly improve the system secrecy performance compared to conventional architectures without IRS. Furthermore, our results unveil that, for physical layer security, uniformly distributing the reflecting elements among multiple IRSs is preferable over deploying them at a single IRS. This work will be presented in part at
position IRSs as a key enabler for improving the physical layer security of wireless communication systems in an economical and energy-efficient manner [15] . However, to fully unleash the potential of IRSs for security provisioning, joint optimization of the IRSs and conventional approaches to enhance physical layer security, such as transmit beamforming and AN injection at the access point (AP), is required.
Recently, the amalgamation of IRSs and physical layer security has received significant attention in the literature. Initial results on IRS-assisted secure wireless systems were provided in [1] , [16] , [17] , starting from a simple network model with only one legitimate user and one eavesdropper.
As a matter of fact, one of the difficulties for algorithm design for IRS-assisted systems are the highly non-convex unit modulus constraints induced by the phase shifter implementation of IRSs. Based on semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and Gaussian randomization methods, suboptimal solutions for both the beamformer at the AP and the phase shifts at the IRS were developed in [17] .
Majorization minimization techniques were leveraged in [1] , [16] to tackle the non-convex unit modulus constraints, which led to a better performance compared to the classical SDR method.
Secure wireless systems comprising multiple legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers were investigated in [18] and [19] , respectively, where manifold optimization and SDR were applied to handle the non-convexity of the formulated problems. To guarantee secure communication, joint optimization of transmit beamforming and AN injection at the AP were considered in both [18] and [19] . The authors of [20] studied the maximization of the minimum secrecy rate among several legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where the unit modulus constraints of the phase shifters were approximated by a set of convex constraints. Although this approach considerably simplifies the algorithm design, it may lead to a significant performance loss. All these existing works [1] , [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] assumed that the potential eavesdroppers are equipped with a single antenna and perfect channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channels is available at the AP. However, in practice, a worst-case assumption is needed for successful security provisioning, i.e., the eavesdroppers are expected to possess more hardware resources and computational capabilities than the legitimate users, e.g., antenna elements and interference mitigation capabilities. Furthermore, acquiring perfect CSI of the eavesdropping channels at the AP is challenging since potential eavesdroppers are not continuously interacting with the AP and the corresponding CSI at the AP may be outdated even if the channel is only slowly time-varying.
Therefore, the assumptions of single-antenna eavesdroppers and perfect eavesdropper CSI at the AP are generally overly optimistic which weakens the generality and practicality of the system models considered in [1] , [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] and the associated resource allocation algorithm designs. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the design of robust and secure IRS-assisted wireless communication systems with multi-antenna eavesdroppers has not been studied in the literature, yet.
To address the aforementioned issues, this paper investigates physical layer security provisioning for IRS-assisted wireless systems, where a multi-antenna AP transmits confidential data to multiple single-antenna legitimate users in the presence of several multi-antenna potential eavesdroppers. To help establish a favorable propagation environment for secure communication, IRSs implemented by programmable phase shifters are deployed. The system sum-rate is maximized by taking into account the imperfect knowledge of the CSI of the eavesdropping channels, while the maximum information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers is constrained. To this end, the design of the considered robust and secure IRS-assisted multiuser multiple-input single-output (MISO) system is formulated as a non-convex optimization problem. The highly non-convex unit modulus constraints induced by the phase shifter implementation and the infinitely many inequality constraints introduced by the imperfect CSI are the main challenges for solving the problem. First, an efficient alternating optimization (AO) based approach is developed to tackle the non-convexity of the problem, and subsequently, the design of the transmit beamformers, AN covariance matrix, and IRS phase shifts is handled by successive convex approximation (SCA) and SDR-based methods.
In particular, the non-convex IRS phase shift design problem with unit modulus constraints is reformulated as an equivalent rank-constrained problem, for which an effective difference of convex (d.c.) function representation is adopted to handle the rank-one constraint. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the AO based algorithm compared to various baseline methods.
Furthermore, our results reveal that by deploying IRSs, favorable channel conditions are created for the legitimate users, and therefore, the physical layer security of wireless systems can be significantly improved. Moreover, we show that uniformly distributing the reflecting elements across multiple IRSs is beneficial for enhancing the secrecy performance.
Notations: In this paper, the imaginary unit of a complex number is denoted by  = √ −1. norm, nuclear norm, and spectral norm of matrix X are represented as det(X), X F , X * , and X 2 , respectively. diag(X 1 , · · · , X n ) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal components are X 1 , · · · , X n ; Diag(X) represents a vector whose elements are extracted from the diagonal elements of matrix X. The largest eigenvalue of matrix X and the corresponding eigenvector are denoted by λ max (X) and λ max (X), respectively. and ∼ mean "defined as" and "distributed as", respectively. Tr(X) and Rank(X) denote the trace and rank of matrix X; X 0 indicates that X is a positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix. The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) vector with mean vector x and covariance matrix Σ is denoted by CN (x, Σ).
Matrices and vectors
For a real-valued continuous function f (X), ∇ X f represents the gradient of f with respect to matrix X. E[·] represents statistical expectation and [x] + = max{0, x}. The optimal value of an optimization variable X is denoted by X .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the system model for secure IRS-assisted multiuser MISO downlink wireless communication. Then, we discuss our assumptions regarding CSI knowledge for system design.
A. IRS-Assisted System Model
We consider the downlink of an IRS-assisted secure communication system that comprises one AP, K single-antenna legitimate users, J roaming users, and L IRSs, as shown in Fig. 1 . The AP is be equipped with N t > 1 transmit antennas. Different from the local legitimate users, the J roaming users are traveling wireless devices belonging to other communication systems and are equipped with N r > 1 antennas. The roaming users may attempt to deliberately eavesdrop the signals transmitted to the legitimate users. Therefore, we treat the J roaming users as potential eavesdroppers. In addition, L passive IRSs are deployed in the network to improve the physical layer security, where IRS l is equipped with M l programmable phase shifters. The direct links from the AP to the legitimate users are assumed to be blocked by obstacles (e.g., buildings). As a result, the AP communicates with the legitimate users via the IRSs and focuses its transmit beams on the IRSs. We assume that both the AP and the IRSs are deployed at sufficiently high altitudes such that the potential eavesdroppers cannot intercept the links between the AP and the IRSs. Furthermore, as the beams reflected by the IRSs to the legitimate users and potential eavesdroppers are typically tilting down to the ground to serve the legitimate users, reflections between IRSs are negligible. Therefore, the downlink received baseband signals at legitimate user k and potential eavesdropper j can be expressed as 1
respectively, where L = {1, · · · , L}, K = {1, · · · , K}, J = {1, · · · , J}, h H k = h H k1 , · · · , h H kL ,
Here, the informationbearing signal transmitted by the AP to legitimate user i and the corresponding beamforming vector are denoted as s i ∈ C and w i ∈ C Nt×1 , respectively, where E[|s i | 2 ] = 1, ∀i, without loss of generality. The channel matrix from the AP to IRS l is denoted as G l ∈ C M l ×Nt , while the channel vector between legitimate user k and IRS l is represented by h H kl ∈ C 1×M l . H jl ∈ C Nr×M l is the channel matrix between eavesdropper j and IRS l. The phase shift matrix Φ l at IRS l is given by Φ l = diag(e θ l1 , e θ l2 , · · · , e θ lM l ), where θ li is the controllable phase shift introduced by the i-th reflecting element of IRS l [22] . In addition, n k ∼ CN 0, σ 2 l,k and n j ∼ CN 0, σ 2 e,j I Nr represent the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at legitimate user k and potential eavesdropper j, with σ 2 l,k and σ 2 e,j being the corresponding noise variances, respectively. z ∈ C Nt×1 is the AN vector generated by the AP to deliberately combat the eavesdroppers. Specifically, z is modeled as a CSCG vector with z ∼ CN (0, Z), where Z ∈ H Nt , Z 0, is the covariance matrix of the AN vector.
The AN is assumed to be unknown to both the legitimate users and the potential eavesdroppers.
For notational convenience, in the rest of this paper, we drop index l in the elements of the phase shift matrices of all IRSs and use Φ = diag(e θ 1 , e θ 2 , · · · , e θ M ), where M = l∈L M l . 
Remark 2:
We assume that resource allocation is performed separately for blocked and nonblocked legitimate users, respectively, via user scheduling. In this paper, we focus on the resource allocation for blocked legitimate users which are supported by multiple IRSs.
B. Channel State Information (CSI)
In this paper, we assume slowly time-varying channels. The AP is able to periodically update and refine the CSI of the legitimate users based on uplink pilots. In particular, the pilots are embedded in the handshaking signals and acknowledgment (ACK) packets transmitted by the legitimate users to the AP at the beginning of each scheduling slot and during the data transmission phase, respectively. Hence, we assume the availability of perfect CSI for the AP-IRS-legitimate user links, G and {h k } K k=1 , during the whole transmission period. On the other hand, for the potential eavesdroppers (roaming users), they send signals to their dedicated wireless systems rather than the AP. Furthermore, as the potential eavesdroppers usually try to hide their existence from the AP, their interactions with the dedicated systems are less frequent. Therefore, although the signal leakage from the potential eavesdroppers to the AP can still be utilized for channel estimation [23] , [24] , the acquired CSI may be coarse and outdated. To account for this effect, we adopt a deterministic model [25] [26] [27] to characterize the CSI uncertainty. Specifically, the CSI of the links between the IRSs and eavesdropper j is modeled as follows
whereH j ∈ C Nr×M is the estimate of the channel of potential eavesdropper j at the AP at the beginning of the scheduling slot. The CSI uncertainty of eavesdropper j is modeled by the term ∆H j . Continuous set Ω j contains all possible CSI uncertainties with their norms bounded by j > 0. The uncertainty radius j represents the level of uncertainty, which in practice is determined by the channel coherence time, transmission rate, and adopted channel estimation algorithm.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we define the adopted performance metrics and formulate the resource allocation design as an optimization problem.
A. Achievable Rate and Secrecy Rate
According to the signal model in (1), the achievable rate (bits/s/Hz) of legitimate user k is given by
Then, for security provisioning, we make a worst-case assumption regarding the capabilities of the potential eavesdroppers. In particular, we assume that the potential eavesdroppers have unlimited computational resources and therefore are able to cancel all multiuser interference before decoding the information transmitted to a given legitimate user. Therefore, the channel capacity (bits/s/Hz) between the AP and potential eavesdropper j for decoding the signal of legitimate user k is given by
where Q j = H j ΦGZG H Φ H H H j +σ 2 e,j I Nr is the noise covariance matrix at potential eavesdropper j. Hence, the maximum achievable secrecy rate between the AP and legitimate user k is given by
and the system sum secrecy rate is given by R s = k∈K R s,k .
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
In this paper, we adopt a worst-case robust sum-rate maximization (WCR-SRM) problem formulation for norm-bounded CSI uncertainties [28] . In particular, our goal is to maximize the system sum-rate while keeping the maximum information leakage to the eavesdroppers below a desired level 2 . The joint design of the transmit beamformers and AN at the AP and the phase 2 Note that the considered WCR-SRM formulation with information leakage constraints offers a higher flexibility for resource allocation than the direct maximization of the secrecy rate with respect to the heterogeneous secrecy requirement of different applications, e.g., video streaming, emails, Internet of Things, etc. In particular, the secrecy performance of each potential eavesdropper can be controlled via the information leakage parameter τ k,j , which allows to strike a balance between the system sum-rate and the system secrecy rate.
shifts at the IRSs can be formulated as follows
In constraint C1, P is a nonnegative parameter denoting the maximum transmit power of the AP. Constraint C2 and Z ∈ H Nt are imposed as the covariance matrix of the AN is a Hermitian PSD matrix. Since the IRSs are assumed to be implemented by a total of M passive phase shifters, the equivalent phase shift matrix Φ is constrained to be a diagonal matrix with M unit modulus elements, as specified by constraint C3. The physical layer security of the system is guaranteed by constraint C4 such that the system secrecy rate is bounded from below by
Here, τ k,j is a predefined parameter which limits the maximum tolerable information leakage to potential eavesdropper j for wiretapping the signal transmitted to legitimate user k.
Obtaining the globally optimal solution for the formulated problem (6) is highly intractable. In particular, the objective function is not jointly concave with respect to w k , Φ, and Z since Φ is coupled with w k and Z in both the numerator and denominator of the signal-to-interference-plusnoise ratio (SINR) term inside the logarithm. In addition, constraint C4 comprises infinitely many inequality constraints due to the continuity of the CSI uncertainty sets, which introduces another challenge for solving problem (6) . More importantly, constraint C3 is highly non-convex as the phase of each phase shifter is constrained to have unit magnitude. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no general approach to solving problem (6) optimally. In the next section, we shall propose an effective algorithm to find a locally optimal solution for problem (6) .
IV. ALGORITHM DESIGN FOR SECURE IRS-ASSISTED WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
In this section, we focus on solving the formulated optimization problem. First, we tackle the coupling of the optimization variables via AO. In fact, AO is a widely applicable and empirically efficient approach for handling optimization problems involving coupled optimization variables. It has been successfully applied to several wireless communication design problems such as hybrid precoding [29] , resource allocation [30] , and IRS-enabled wireless communication [1] . For the problem at hand, based on the principle of AO, we alternately solve for {w k , Z} and Φ while fixing the other variables. This yields a stationary point solution of problem (6) as will be detailed in the following two subsections.
A. Optimization of Transmit Beamforming and AN
We first present the optimization of the beamforming vectors w k and AN covariance matrix Z for a given phase shift matrix Φ. In particular, we first convert the infinitely many constraints in constraint C4 to a finite number of equivalent constraints. To develop efficient algorithms for optimizing w k and Z, SDR and SCA techniques are then leveraged to tackle the non-convexity of both the objective function and the constraints of problem (6) . Now, for a given phase shift matrix Φ, the optimization problem for the design of w k and Z is given by
Constraint C4 is a non-convex constraint involving infinitely many inequality constraints due to the continuity of the CSI uncertainty sets Ω j . To overcome this difficulty, we first convert the infinite number of constraints in C4 to an equivalent form with only a finite number of constraints by leveraging the following proposition and lemma.
Proposition 1. Constraint C4 has the following equivalent representation 
where A, D ∈ H m , X, B ∈ C m×n , and C ∈ H n . This QMI holds if and only if there exist p ≥ 0
provided that there exists a pointX such that h(X) 0.
Substituting (2) into (8), we can recast constraint C4 as follows
where
and p k,j ≥ 0, ∀k, j. The transformed constraint C4 involves only KJ LMI constraints, which is more amenable for algorithm design compared to the infinitely many constraints in the original constraint C4. However, the resulting optimization problem is still not jointly convex with respect to p k,j , w k , and Z. To proceed, we recast the optimization problem as a rank-constrained semidefinite programming (SDP) problem. With W k w k w H k problem (7) can be rewritten as
are imposed to guarantee that W k = w k w H k still holds after optimizing W k . All constraints of problem (14) are convex except for constraint C6. Next, we tackle the non-convexity of the objective function in problem (14) . To enable efficient algorithm design, we first rewrite the objective function in form of d.c. functions, i.e.,
are two functions that are both jointly convex in terms of p k,j , W k , and Z. Now, we adopt the SCA method to obtain a convex upper bound for the objective function in an iterative manner. To facilitate SCA, we construct a global underestimator for function D 1 , where we use superscript (t) to denote the iteration index of the optimization variables. In particular, for any feasible point
and Z (t) , a lower bound of function D 1 is given by its first-order Taylor approximation, which can be expressed as
where the gradients of function D 1 with respect to Z and W k are given by
and
respectively. By employing this upper bound on the objective function, the only remaining nonconvexity of problem (14) is due to rank constraint C6. Generally, solving such a rank-constrained problem is known to be NP-hard [32] . To overcome this issue, we adopt the SDR technique and drop the rank constraint C6. Therefore, the resulting problem that needs to be solved at feasible point W (t) and Z (t) is given by
This relaxed problem is jointly convex with respect to p k,j , W k , and Z, and hence can be efficiently solved by standard convex program solvers such as CVX [33] . However, in general, there is no guarantee that the solution obtained by SDR satisfies the rank constraint. Nevertheless, we prove the tightness of the SDR method for problem (19) in the following theorem.
Then, there always exists another optimal solution of problem (19) , denoted as W k ,Z ,p k,j , which not only achieves the same objective value as W k , Z , p k,j , but also meets the rank constraint, i.e., Rank W k ≤ 1.
Proof: See Appendix B for the proof of Theorem 1. The construction of the optimal rank-one solution is given in (41).
Theorem 1 indicates that we can always obtain or construct a rank-constrained optimal solution for problem (19) . In addition, according to Theorem 1, the optimal beamforming vector w k can always be recovered fromW k given in (41) by performing Cholesky decomposition, i.e.,W k =
B. Optimization of Phase Shifts at IRSs
Next, we present the optimization of phase shift matrix Φ for given transmit beamforming vectors w k and AN covariance matrix Z. By applying Lemma 1, the optimization problem for the IRSs is given by
The main difficulty in solving problem (20) is the unit modulus constraint C3 on the main diagonal elements of Φ. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no general approach to solve unit modulus constrained non-convex optimization problems optimally. In this paper, we propose to rewrite problem (20) by adopting v Diag (Φ) as the optimization variable instead of Φ itself, which paves the way for leveraging SDP and SCA methods to facilitate the design of an efficient algorithm for secure IRS-assisted systems. To start with, we first take constraint C4 as an example to illustrate the proposed reformulation. By performing the singular value decomposition (SVD)
Then, the objective function can be rewritten as a function of v in a similar manner as (21) . To facilitate SDP, we define V vv H , and therefore problem (20) can be recast as
where L k = diag h H k G. Constraints V ∈ H M , C8, and C9 are imposed to guarantee that V = vv H holds after optimization. More importantly, constraint C7 is introduced to guarantee the unit modulus constraint when recovering v from V.
Recall that for the optimization of W k and Z, we have temporarily removed the rank constraint on W k and proved the tightness of the SDR method. However, due to the presence of constraint C7 induced by the unit modulus constraint, the rank of the solution obtained from problem (22) is generally larger than one [32] . As a result, instead of applying the SDR method adopted in Section IV-A, we handle the rank-one constraint via a different approach. In particular, we first rewrite the rank-one constraint C9 in an equivalent form:
Note that for any X ∈ H m×n , the inequality X * = i σ i ≥ X 2 = max i {σ i } holds, where σ i is the i-th singular value of X. Equality holds if and only if X has unit rank. Constraint C9 ensures this equality, which is equivalent to enforcing constraint C9.
Constraint C9 is in a d.c. form and therefore still non-convex with respect to V. To overcome the non-convexity, we apply a penalty-based method as in [34, Ch. 17] , [35] by moving constraint C9 into the objective function, which results in the following optimization problem
where ρ > 0 is a penalty factor penalizing the violation of constraint C9, and the following proposition states the equivalence of problems (22) and (24).
Proposition 2. Let V s be the optimal solution of problem (24) for penalty factor ρ s . When ρ s is sufficiently small, i.e., for ρ s → 0, then any limit pointV of the sequence {V s } is an optimal solution of problem (22) .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 implies that we can obtain a rank-one solutionV by solving problem (24) for a sufficiently small value of penalty factor ρ. In other words, the diagonal elements of the phase shift matrix Φ, i.e., v, can always be recovered from the rank-one solutionV by performing Cholesky decomposition ofV = vv H . Since after the proposed series of transformations, the constraints in problem (24) form a convex set, we may adopt a similar approach as in Section IV-A to tackle the d.c. objective function and employ SCA. In particular, for any feasible point V (t) , a lower bound
Therefore, the optimization problem to be solved for a given feasible point
This optimization problem is jointly convex with respect to p k,j and V, and hence it can be efficiently solved by standard convex program solvers such as CVX [33] .
The overall AO algorithm proposed in this section is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that the minimum values of problems (19) and (27) serve as upper bounds for the optimal values of problems (14) and (24), respectively. By iteratively solving problems (19) and (27) Find W (t+1) k and Z (t+1) by solving problem (19) for the given Φ = Φ (t) ; 4: Set
Solve problem (27) for given W k = W (t+1) k and Z = Z (t+1) , and update V (t+1) ; 6: Decompose
that converges to a stationary value in polynomial time, and any limit point of the sequence
t∈N is a stationary point of problem (6) [36] . Furthermore, the computational complexity of each iteration of the proposed AO algorithm is given by
is the big-O notation.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS

A. Simulation Setup
The schematic system model for the simulated single-cell network is shown in Fig. 2 . The AP is located at the center of the cell with radius R. The legitimate users and potential eavesdroppers are randomly and uniformly distributed in the cell. Note that one of the motivations for deploying IRSs in secure wireless systems is to establish favorable communication links for legitimate users that would otherwise be blocked. To illustrate this effect, we consider a scenario where L IRSs are deployed to improve the secrecy performance of K legitimate users whose direct links to the AP are blocked by obstacles. Each potential eavesdropper is equipped with N r = 2 antennas. The channel matrix G l between the AP and IRS l is modeled as follows
where L 0 = λc 4π 2 is a constant with λ c being the wavelength of the center frequency of the information carrier. The distance between the AP and IRS l is denoted by d l while α l is the corresponding path loss exponent. The small-scale fading is assumed to be Ricean fading with Ricean factor β l . The LoS and non-LoS components are represented by G L l and G N l , which are modeled as the product of the array response vectors of the transceivers and Rayleigh fading, respectively. The other channels in the system are generated in a similar manner as we expect that legitimate users with LoS links to the IRSs are served and the potential eavesdroppers may also position themselves in the LoS of the IRSs. To facilitate the presentation, we define the maximum normalized estimation error of the eavesdropping channels as κ j = j / H j F , ∀j. The system parameters used for our simulations are listed in Table I .
B. Baseline Schemes
We adopt two baseline schemes for comparison. For baseline 1, we adopt simple design choices without performing iterative optimization. In particular, we adopt maximum ratio transmission (MRT) for transmit beamforming, apply an isotropic radiation pattern for AN injection, and implement the IRSs with random phases. As for MRT, we set
where k is the power allocated to legitimate user k, which is optimized together with the power allocated to the AN to satisfy the total transmit power and secrecy constraints as stated in (6) . For baseline 2, we evaluate the system performance when IRSs are not deployed 3 . In this case, the legitimate 3 If IRSs are not used, the beams emitted by the AP are typically down tilting towards the ground to reach the legitimate users, and therefore, different from the scenario described in Section II-A, the direct links to both the legitimate users and the potential eavesdroppers have to be taken into consideration for baseline 2. users are blocked by infrastructures, and therefore the channels between the AP and the legitimate users are assumed to be non-LoS. As the potential eavesdroppers can move freely in the network, the channels between the AP and eavesdroppers are assumed to be still LoS-dominated, which is an unfavorable scenario for secure communication. In baseline 2, we optimize the beamforming vectors and AN covariance matrix at the AP by setting Φ = I Nt and solving problem (7) .
In the following, we investigate the impact of the different system parameters by focusing on the case of one IRS in Sections V-C to V-H while multi-IRS systems will be studied in Section V-I.
C. Convergence of the Proposed Algorithm
In Fig. 3 , we investigate the convergence of the proposed algorithm for different numbers of antenna elements, N t , IRS reflecting elements, M , and legitimate users, K. As can be observed from Fig. 3 , the proposed algorithm monotonically converges for all considered values of N t , M , and K. In particular, for N t = M = 5, K = 3, the proposed algorithm converges after around 15 iterations. For the case with more antennas and IRS reflecting elements, i.e., N t = M = 10, K = 3, the proposed algorithm needs 15 iterations more to converge since the dimensions of the search space in problems (19) and (27) increase with N t and M . For the case with more legitimate users, i.e., N t = M = 10, K = 6, the proposed algorithm needs considerably more iterations to converge since the number of optimization variables in problem (19) and the numbers of constraints in problems (19) and (27) both increase with the number of legitimate users. Hence, the number of iterations required for the proposed algorithm to converge is less sensitive to the numbers of antennas and IRS reflecting elements than to the number of legitimate users.
D. Average System Sum Rate Versus the Maximum Transmit Power
In Fig. 4 , we show the average system sum-rate versus the maximum total transmit power at the AP, P , while limiting the information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers to τ k,j = 1 bits/s/Hz, ∀k, j. As can be observed from Fig. 4 , the system sum-rate increases monotonically with the maximum transmit power budget. This is because by applying the proposed optimization framework, the SINRs of the legitimate users can be improved by providing them with additional transmit power, which leads to an improvement of the system sum-rate. Fig. 4 also shows that the average system sum-rate of the proposed scheme exceeds that of both considered baseline schemes by a considerable margin. In particular, for baseline 1, the fixed MRT beamforming is unable to fully exploit the extra DoFs introduced by the additional transmit power. In fact, the MRT strategy in baseline 1 is unable to mitigate multiuser interference resulting in performance saturation in the high transmit power regime. For baseline 2, the performance loss compared to the proposed scheme is mainly due to the huge path loss of the AP-legitimate user links as the legitimate users are assumed to be blocked. Fig. 4 reveals the huge performance gains enabled by deploying an IRS to establish an LoS propagation environment for the legitimate users. Fig. 5(a) depicts the average secrecy rate defined in (5) versus the maximum tolerable channel capacity of the potential eavesdroppers, τ k,j . We assume that the maximum tolerable capacity of different eavesdroppers are identical, i.e., τ k,j = τ , ∀k, j. As can be observed, the system secrecy rate is almost zero if the IRS is not available (baseline 2), which is mainly due to the poor channel conditions between the AP and the legitimate users. In other words, for blocked legitimate users, secure wireless communication cannot be guaranteed without the favorable propagation environment created by the IRS. Furthermore, the average secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme is significantly higher than that of baseline 1, which confirms the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. As shown in Fig. 5(b) , when τ is small, a large portion of the transmit power is allocated to transmitting AN to deteriorate the achievable rates of the potential eavesdroppers, and therefore, there is less power left for information beamforming to maximize the system sum-rate. As τ increases, the constraints on the performance of the eavesdroppers are relaxed, and hence, more transmit power is allocated to beamforming and to improving the system sum-rate, as can be observed in Figs. 5(b) and 5(c). Recall that the secrecy rate is given by
E. Secrecy Rate Versus the Maximum Tolerable Channel Capacity of the Eavesdroppers
For large τ , the maximum channel capacity of the potential eavesdroppers k∈K max j∈J {C j,k } grows faster than the system sum-rate k∈K R k , as can be observed in Fig. 5(c) . Therefore, the secrecy rate decreases for large τ , see also Fig.   5(a) . Hence, if system sum secrecy rate maximization is desired, τ has to be carefully chosen. We note that the maximum secrecy rate can be found by solving the considered problem for different values of τ .
F. Energy Efficiency Evaluation
IRSs are advocated as energy-efficient devices for assisting wireless communication. In Fig.   6 , we investigate the energy efficiency versus the number of antenna elements at the AP and the number of reflecting elements at the IRS. We adopt a linear power consumption model, and the energy efficiency (bits/J/Hz) is defined as the ratio of the system sum-rate to the total power consumption of the system [38] 
where µ is the power amplifier efficiency, and P t accounts for the circuit power consumption introduced by deploying one antenna element, which is mainly caused by the power consumed by the corresponding RF chain. P o is the static circuit power of the AP, consumed by the cooling system, power supply, etc., and P I is the power consumption of the IRS controller. Following [38] , we set µ = 0.32, P t = 35 mW, P I = 20 mW, and P o = 34 mW. In Fig. 6 , we show the average energy efficiency as a function of the number of reflecting elements at the IRS for N t = 3
antennas (blue curves) and as a function of the number of transmit antennas for M = 3 IRS reflecting elements (red curves). As can be observed from Fig. 6 , increasing the number of IRS elements leads to an improvement of the energy efficiency. The reason behind this is twofold. On the one hand, as they are passive devices, enlarging the IRS size causes little additional power consumption. On the other hand, additional phase shifters can reflect more of the power received from the AP, which leads to a power gain, and provide more flexibility for resource allocation, which improves the beamforming gain for the links from the IRS to the legitimate users. In contrast, the energy efficiency is a monotone decreasing function with respect to the number of antennas at the AP. This is mainly because more power-hungry RF chains are required as the number of antennas increases, which outweighs the system sum-rate gain introduced by deploying more antennas. Fig. 6 clearly demonstrates the superiority of IRS-assisted secure communication systems compared to conventional multi-antenna secure wireless systems in terms of energy efficiency. Fig. 7 shows the average system sum-rate versus the number of legitimate users, K. As can be observed, the system sum-rates achieved by the proposed scheme and both baseline schemes monotonically increase with the number of legitimate users. This is due to the fact that both the proposed scheme and the two baseline schemes are able to exploit multiuser diversity. However, the system sum-rate and its growth rate are substantially lower for the baseline schemes compared to the proposed scheme. In particular, the MRT strategy adopted in baseline 1 fails to mitigate multiuser interference, which quickly leads to a saturation of the performance. On the other hand, without the LoS links created by the IRS for the legitimate users, baseline 2 achieves the lowest H. CSI Uncertainty Fig. 8 (a) shows the average system sum-rate versus the normalized maximum channel estimation error variance. We assume that all eavesdropping channels have the same maximum normalized estimation error variance, i.e., κ j = κ, ∀j. As can be observed, for the proposed scheme and both baseline schemes, the average system sum-rates decrease as the quality of the CSI degrades. In particular, the worse the quality of the estimated CSI is, the more difficult it is for the AP to perform accurate beamforming and efficient AN jamming, which results in a lower achievable system sumrate. In addition, the proposed scheme significantly outperforms both baseline schemes over the entire range of considered estimation error variances, which indicates that the proposed scheme can exploit the spatial DoFs available for security provisioning more efficiently than the two baseline schemes even in the presence of CSI uncertainty. In Fig. 8(b) , the outage probability of the potential eavesdroppers versus the target SINR is investigated for κ 2 = 0.1. The outage probability is defined as the probability that the received SINR values at the eavesdroppers are higher than a predefined target SINR. For comparison, we also investigate the outage probability of a non-robust scheme.
G. Average System Sum-Rate Versus the Number of Legitimate Users
The considered non-robust scheme treats the estimated CSI of the eavesdropping channels, i.e.,H j , as perfect CSI. As can be observed, a significant outage probability reduction can be achieved via robust optimization with the proposed scheme and even with the baseline schemes compared to the non-robust scheme, especially in the low target SINR regime. Specifically, the outage probability of the proposed scheme is 10% at −1 dB whereas the outage probability of the non-robust scheme is as high as 80%. Furthermore, as we set the maximum tolerable channel capacity of the potential eavesdroppers to τ k,j = 1 bits/s/Hz, the outage probabilities of the proposed scheme and both baseline schemes are zero when the target SINRs are no less than 0 dB (as log 2 (1 + 1) = 1 bits/s/Hz). In contrast, the outage probability for the non-robust scheme at 0 dB is still higher than 30%. These results confirm the robustness of the proposed scheme.
I. Single IRS or Multiple IRSs?
In this subsection, we compare the average system sum-rates achieved by deploying a single IRS and two IRSs in the secure wireless network shown in Fig. 2 . For the scenario when two IRSs are deployed, they are symmetrically located to the East and West of the AP. We assume that there are in total M = 10 reflecting elements available for deployment of the two IRSs. In particular, M 1 reflecting elements are allocated to IRS 1, and M 2 = M − M 1 elements are assigned to IRS 2. As can be observed in Fig. 9 , the proposed scheme considerably outperforms both baseline schemes for all IRS settings. In addition, it is beneficial to deploy two IRSs compared to only one. This is because multiple IRSs create several independent propagation paths including LoS components from the AP to the legitimate users, which introduces macro diversity. Specifically, the average distance between the IRS reflecting elements and the legitimate users are reduced by deploying multiple IRSs in the network. In fact, the peak system sum-rate is achieved by uniformly distributing the reflecting elements among the deployed IRSs, i.e., 5 reflecting elements for each IRS. As indicated by Fig. 6 , the performance gain diminishes as the number of reflecting elements at one IRS grows large compared to the number of users. Therefore, a biased allocation with exceedingly many reflecting elements at one of the IRSs is not favorable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we incorporated IRSs in multiuser MISO systems to achieve secure communication in the presence of multiple multi-antenna potential eavesdroppers for the challenging case where the legitimate users do not have a LoS link to the AP. The transmit beamformers, AN covariance matrix, and IRS phase shifts were jointly optimized to maximize the system sum-rate while satisfying secrecy constraints for the potential eavesdroppers. We focused on the robust design of such IRS-assisted secure wireless systems taking into account the imperfection of the CSI of the eavesdropping channels. An efficient AO algorithm that yields a stationary solution of the formulated non-convex optimization problem was proposed. In particular, the resulting challenging unit modulus constrained optimization problem was transformed to a rank constrained problem, for which an effective d.c. function representation was employed to facilitate the application of SDR and SCA techniques. Simulation results have verified the tremendous potential of IRSs to improve the physical layer security of future wireless communication systems in an energy-efficient manner.
Our results also confirmed the robustness of the proposed scheme with respect to imperfect CSI and its ability to exploit multiuser diversity. Furthermore, design guidelines for multi-IRS systems were provided. In particular, the uniform distribution of the reflecting elements among multiple IRSs was shown to be favorable for improving physical layer security and exploiting macro diversity gains.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
According to Sylvester's determinant identity det (I + AB) = det (I + BA), we have
where (a) holds since matrix Q −1 j H j ΦGw k w H k G H Φ H H H j has rank one, and therefore its maximum eigenvalue is the only non-zero eigenvalue. By substituting the expression of Q j defined after (4) into the last LMI, we obtain the result in Proposition 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We first express problem (19) in its epigraph form as follows 4
This problem is jointly convex with respect to the optimization variables and satisfies Slater's constraint qualification. Therefore, strong duality holds and the Lagrangian function in terms of W k is given by
where ξ includes all terms that do not involve W k . The Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints C1, C4, C5, and C10 in problem (31) are denoted by γ ≥ 0, Ω k,j ∈ H M +Nr , Υ k ∈ H Nt , and δ k ≥ 0, respectively. Then, we investigate the structure of W k by checking the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for problem (31) , which are given by
where γ , Ω k,j , Υ k , and δ k are the optimal Lagrangian multipliers for the dual problem of (31).
Since constraint C10 is active at the optimal solution, we have δ k > 0. KKT condition K3 can be further expressed as
First, we discuss the case when matrix B is full rank, i.e., Rank (B k ) = N t . Recall that
is a rank-one matrix. Then, we obtain for the rank of matrix Υ k ,
The last inequality holds because Rank (A − B) ≥ Rank (A) − Rank (B) for any A and B of the same dimension. Suppose Rank (Υ k ) = N t , then K1 implies that W k = 0, i.e., Rank (W k ) = 0.
Suppose Rank (Υ k ) = N t − 1, then K1 implies that the null space of Υ k is spanned by a vector, and W k can be expressed as
Hence, the optimal solution W k of problem (19) satisfies C6 if Rank (B k ) = N t .
Next, we exploit [39, Prop. 4.1] and study the case when matrix B k is not full rank, i.e., r = Rank (B k ) < N t . Let Π k ∈ C Nt×(Nt−r) be the orthonormal basis of B k 's null space, whose columns are {π k,i } Nt−r i=1 . Since Υ k is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the PSD constraint C5, we have
Since constraint C10 is active at the optimal solution, we have δ k > 0. Therefore,
which means that Π k spans N t − r orthogonal dimensions of Υ k 's null space. Therefore, let N k be the orthonormal basis of Υ k 's null space, where Rank (N k ) ≥ N t − r. In addition, we have
where (b) follows from the same inequality as (35) . As a result, the rank of N k is either N t − r or N t − r + 1. Suppose Rank (N k ) = N t − r, according to (38) , we have N k = Π k . According to K1 and (38) , W k can be expressed as W k = Nt−r i=1 c k,i π k,i π k,i H , where c k,i ∈ R is a scaling factor for π k,i . However, in this case, we have W k M k = 0 since we have proved that M k Π k = 0 in (38) . This means that there is no information received by legitimate user k even if we allocate power to the beamformer for legitimate user k. Hence, this cannot correspond to the optimal solution of problem (19) . Suppose Rank (N k ) = N t − r + 1, then we can express N k as N k = Π k a k and therefore the optimal solution W k can be written in the form of
where c k,i > 0, a k ∈ R is a scaling factor for a k , (Π k ) H a k = 0 since N k is the orthonormal basis of Υ k 's null space, and we have Υ k a k = 0 according to (38) . Therefore, we propose to construct an optimal rank-oneW k when matrix B k is not full rank as follows:
c k,i π k,i π k,i H = a k a k (a k ) H ,Z = Z + Nt−r i=1 c k,i π k,i π k,i H ,p k,j = p k,j .
(41)
Note that with the construction in (41), we obtain a rank-one solutionW k and a PSD matrixZ .
Hence, the remaining tasks for proving the tightness of SDR are to check the feasibility ofW k andZ , and to show that this construction yields the same optimal objective value as W k and Z .
It is easy to see that the construction in (41) does not affect the value of N and constraint C1 in (16) due to the fact that Z + k∈K W k =Z + k∈KW k . For constraint C4 in problem (19) , we have
where D k = (2 τ k,j − 1) j =k Nr−r i=1 c j,i π j,i π j,i H + 2 τ k,j Nr−r i=1 c k,i π k,i π k,i H 0.
Therefore, the LMIs in C4 still hold forW k andZ . Finally, we show that the construction in (41) does not change the value of the last two terms in the objective function of problem (19) .
According to (18) , we have
The last equality holds since we have proved that M k Π k = 0 in (38) , which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the objective function of problem (22) as f (V), and let V be its optimal solution, that is, f (V ) ≤ f (V) , for all V that satisfy 5 V * − V 2 = 0. Denote the objective function of problem (24) as g (V; ρ). Since V s is the optimal solution of problem (24) for penalty factor ρ s , we have g (V s ; ρ s ) ≤ g (V ; ρ s ), which leads to the inequality
where the last equality holds as V is the optimal solution of problem (22) and therefore the rank-one constraint must be satisfied. By rewriting (46), we obtain
SupposeV is a limit point of sequence {V s } and there is an infinite subsequence S such that lim s∈S V s =V. By taking the limit as s → ∞, s ∈ S, on both sides of (47), we have
where the first equality holds due to the continuity of the function X * − X 2 . Hence, we have V * − V 2 = 0, soV is feasible for problem (22) . Furthermore, by taking the limit as s → ∞ for s ∈ S in (46), we have by the non-negativity of ρ s and of the term V s * − V s 2 that
AsV is a feasible point whose objective value is no larger than that of the optimal solution V , we conclude thatV, too, is an optimal solution for (22) , which completes the proof.
